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Shame plays a fundamental role in the regulation of our social behavior. One intriguing
question is whether amygdala might play a role in processing this emotion. In the present
single-case study, we tested a patient with acquired damage of bilateral amygdalae and
surrounding areas as well as healthy controls on shame processing and other social
cognitive tasks. Results revealed that the patient’s subjective experience of shame,
but not of guilt, was more reduced than in controls, only when social standards
were violated, while it was not different than controls in case of moral violations.
The impairment in discriminating between normal social situations and violations also
emerged. Taken together, these findings suggest that the role of the amygdala in
processing shame might reflect its relevance in resolving ambiguity and uncertainty, in
order to correctly detect social violations and to generate shame feelings.
Keywords: amygdala, moral emotions, shame, emotion recognition, Guilt
INTRODUCTION
The amygdala is a subcortical nucleus which has been related to a broad variety of functions
including facial emotion recognition, social cognition, and reward learning (Adolphs, 2010; Janak
and Tye, 2015).While early findings highlighted the amygdala’s role in processing facial expressions,
specifically fear expressions (Adolphs et al., 1994; Calder, 1996), and were initially interpreted by
hypothesizing the amygdala involvement in processing stimuli signaling threat (Adolphs, 2010),
more recent investigations highlighted that its role in processing faces might have something
to do with the allocation of processing resources toward specific features to disambiguate facial
expression meaning (Adolphs, 2010; Spezio et al., 2007). While patients with amygdala damage
have been associated with reduced ability to recognize fearful faces (Adolphs et al., 1994; Calder,
1996), they, however, display spared abilities to recognize the same emotion by other body parts
(i.e., gestures, Atkinson et al., 2007) or modalities (i.e., prosody, Adolphs and Tranel, 1999;
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Bach et al., 2013). Moreover, they also show reduced tendency
to fixate the eye region (Adolphs et al., 2005; Spezio et al.,
2007), ignoring the facial features that are diagnostic when
recognizing fearful expressions (Smith et al., 2005). Aside
from disambiguation, the amygdala might play further roles
in emotional processing. Indeed, several neuroimaging studies
reported that amygdala activation is sensitive to a wide repertoire
of emotional stimuli, including both negatively and positively
valenced items (Costafreda et al., 2008; Sabatinelli et al.,
2011) and leading to the hypothesis that the amygdala might
be involved in arousal processing (Anderson et al., 2003).
Indeed, amygdala activation is modulated by the arousal of
the stimuli (Anderson et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2009; Bonnet
et al., 2015) and is coupled with psychophysiological responses
(Bonnet et al., 2015).
Neuroimaging studies revealed that amygdala activation
was associated with shame induction (Finger et al., 2006;
Pulcu et al., 2014) and that amygdala volume correlated with
shame proneness (Whittle et al., 2016). In addition, deep-brain
stimulation of the amygdala induced in a patient the emotional
experience of shame (Inman et al., 2018). Specifically, a patient’s
emotional response was modulated by a stimulation intensity of
5 V associated with shame experience, and higher stimulations
were associated with fear experience. In addition, these emotional
responses were not evoked in other patients undergoing the same
stimulation protocol (Inman et al., 2018). Together, these findings
suggest that the amygdala might play a crucial role in generating
shame experience.
However, other studies highlighted the amygdala’s role in
understanding social situations (Martin and Weisberg, 2003;
Noack et al., 2015; Lymer et al., 2018) and in detecting social
violations (Berthoz et al., 2006; Bas-Hoogendam et al., 2017).
These latter functions are highly correlated with shameful
experiences, since shame generation requires accurate social
situation assessment and is usually triggered by social and moral
violations (Tangney et al., 2007). Specifically, shame usually
occurs when an individual perceives the self or the persona
as inadequate with respect to the accepted social and moral
standards (Tangney et al., 1992), especially when a specific
aspect of the self-image is perceived as defective (Gausel and
Leach, 2011). In addition, shame generation leads to behavioral
inhibition (Tangney et al., 2007) and, together with guilt, which
is often associated with shame, promotes changing in the self
and the behavior against immorality (Gausel and Brown, 2012;
Martinez et al., 2014).
The aim of the present study is to clarify how amygdala
damage can a ect shame processing at di erent levels. In order
to achieve this aim, we tested a patient with acquired brain
damage at the level of bilateral amygdalae and surrounding
tissues with di erent tasks tapping social cognitive skills, emotion
facial recognition, and subjective experience. Specifically, we
tested the subjective emotional experience of a patient by asking
him to rate his level of shame associated with specific social
situations. These situations involved violations of social and
moral standards. If the amygdala is involved in generated
emotional responses, we expect reduced shame emotional
ratings compared with that in control participants in any
condition. Conversely, if no di erence or di erences only in
some conditions on the ratings between controls and the patient
are present, it might not be attributed to primary emotional
deficit. Hence, in this latter outcome, the role of the amygdala
in moral judgment might not be ascribed to shame or guilt
generation. Aside from this experimental task, to control for
other basic deficits that might influence the outcome of this
experimental tasks, the patient’s cognitive abilities and social
cognitive skills were further investigated in a neuropsychological
assessment. In addition, the patient was also evaluated on a
set of emotion recognition tasks, following previous studies
on patients with amygdala damage which reported deficits in
recognizing fearful faces and spared ability to recognize emotion
through body parts and prosody. Moreover, testing emotion
recognition would allow us to ascertain whether shameful facial
expression, which, di erent from other moral emotions, was
also reported to be characterized by distinctive features (i.e.,
gaze movement downward and blushing) (Asendorpf, 1990;
Keltner and Buswell, 1997), might also be impaired. Indeed, we
hypothesized that shame experience deficit, if present, might




FF is a right-handed middle-aged man, with 13 years of
education, who was admitted to the rehabilitation ward with
a diagnosis of Erdheim–Chester disease (non-Langerhans cells
histiocytosis, see Diamond et al., 2014), with neurological and
dermatological symptoms. About 2 years earlier, FF showed
hyperprolactinemia and diabetes insipidus, and subsequently,
he reported hyposthenia and hypoesthesia of the lower limbs,
balance issues, emotional lability, and hypogeusia and received
a diagnosis of gait ataxia and mild right hemiparesis. The MRI
scan, acquired at the moment of the diagnosis, revealed bilateral
cortical thickening mainly at the level of the amygdala. The lesion
extended to the pituitary stalk, optic chiasm, and hypothalamus
and involved also the lenticular nucleus, internal and external
capsule in the left hemisphere, and the external capsule in the
right hemisphere. Moreover, di use signal intensity alterations
involved the cervical and thoracic spinal cord (mainly in the
FIGURE 1 | FF’s MRI scans: FLAIR (left) and T1-weighted
gadolinium-enhanced (right) sequences.
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posterior columns). At the time of testing, the neurological
symptoms had regressed, with a marked reduction of the
emotional lability, mild improvement of the motor abilities, and
minimal impairments in the cerebellar tests. Likewise, the MRI
pattern at 5 months after the diagnosis and 4 months before
the neuropsychological testing (see Figure 1) revealed a marked
reduction in intensity alteration at the level of the amygdala,
hippocampus, and pituitary stalk. Signal alterations located
within the bilateral internal and external capsule, as well as at the
level of right lenticular nucleus, were no longer detectable.
Before taking part in the experiment, patient FF, as well
as a sample of healthy controls, signed an informed consent,
which was approved by the local ethical committee (CEUR –
regional ethical committee of Friuli Venezia Giulia). Healthy
control samples included 13 age- and education-matched healthy
male individuals (age: 48.6 ± 9.3, education: 13.8 ± 3.2, MMSE:
29.5 ± 0.5) who were tested on all the experimental tasks,
as well as on Positive and Negative A ect Schedule (PANAS)
and TOSCA. The sample size of the healthy control group was
chosen based on previous single-case studies in the field of
emotion processing (Pishnamazi et al., 2016; Bennetts et al., 2017;
Bach et al., 2019).
For technical reasons, three individuals from the sample of the
healthy controls were not tested in the emotion recognition from
the prosody task and the emotional gestures recognition task,
while another participant was not tested on PANAS.
TABLE 1 | Neuropsychological battery and questionnaires.
Test Range Cutoffs Raw score (corrected score) Z-scores
Memory
Digit span forward 0–9 < 4.26 6 (5.75)
Corsi’s span forward 0–9 < 3.46 5 (4.74)
Digit span backward 0–9 < 2.65 4 (3.71)
Corsi’s span backwards 0–9 < 3.08 5 (4.77)
Prose memory 0–28 < 7.5 14.5 (15)
Executive functions and attention
Trail making test
-A – > 94 59 (56)
-B – > 283 158 (152)
Phonemic/semantic alternate fluency – < 12.7 26 (25.31)
-Composite shifting index < 0.38 1.15 (1.12)
Similarities 0–28 6*
Raven’s progressive matrices 0–36  18.96 34 (31.80)
Tower of London test 0–36 32 -0.57U
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
-Number of categories 0–6  2 2*
-Number of perseverations 0–36   6.41 –
Verbal judgment test 0–50 – 46 (40.25)
Cognitive estimation test 0–27  12 9 (9.62)
Language
Phonological fluency – < 17.35 18 (13.3)*
Semantic fluency – < 28.34 27 (27.34)*
Praxis
Freehand copying of drawings task 0–12  7.18 9 (8.4)
Clock drawing test 0–10  8 8.5
Perception
Facial recognition test 0–54 < 39 39
Affective state
PANAS
-Positive 0–50 37 0.95§
-Negative 0–50 18 -0.05§
The table shows the patient’s performances on the neuropsychological battery including short-term (digit span forward and Corsi’s span forward, Monaco et al., 2013)
and long-term memory (prose memory, Novelli et al., 1986), working memory (digit span backward and Corsi’s span backwards, Monaco et al., 2013), attention (trail
making test – part A, Giovagnoli et al., 1996) and executive functions (trail making test – part B, Giovagnoli et al., 1996; phonemic/semantic alternate fluency, Costa et al.,
2014; similarities subtest of WAIS, Wechsler, 2014; Tower of London test, Krikorian et al., 1994; Raven’s progressive matrices, Carlesimo et al., 1996; Wisconsin card
sorting test, Caffarra et al., 2004; verbal judgment test, Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987; and cognitive estimation test, Scarpina et al., 2015), fluency (phonological fluency,
Carlesimo et al., 1996; semantic fluency, Costa et al., 2014), praxis (freehand copying of drawings task, Carlesimo et al., 1996; clock drawing test, Mondini et al., 2003),
and perception (facial recognition test, Benton et al., 1994; Albonico et al., 2017). *Impaired performance. § Obtained with healthy controls mean and standard deviation
scores. UObtained with normative data.
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Neuropsychological Assessment
FF underwent a neuropsychological battery to assess his cognitive
abilities (see Table 1). The battery included short- and long-
term memory (prose memory), working memory (digit span
backward and Corsi’s span backwards, attention (trail making
test – part A) and executive functions (trail making test –
part B, phonemic/semantic alternate fluency, WAIS similarities
subtest, Tower of London test, Raven’s progressive matrices,
Wisconsin card sorting test, verbal judgment test, and cognitive
estimation test), fluency (phonological fluency and semantic
fluency), praxis (freehand copying of drawings task and clock
drawing test), and perception (facial recognition test). Finally,
the PANAS (Crawford and Henry, 2004) was administered in
order to assess the current a ectivity of the participants. PANAS,
consisting of 10 items measuring both negative and positive
a ect, is a self-report questionnaire in which participants are
asked to indicate their level of experienced a ect in that moment
in a 5-point Likert scale.
Social Cognition Battery
Social cognition battery (Prior et al., 2003) is a self-administered
task with four di erent tests assessing di erent aspects of social
cognition, namely, the emotion attribution, the theory of mind,
the social situation, and the moral/conventional distinction. In
each test, the participant is asked to read brief stories and to
answer the related questions. In the emotion attribution test,
brief stories describe one character in a specific situation (e.g.,
Silvia wakes up and sees a poisonous spider in her bed). The
participant is asked to give a free answer to specific questions
related to the feeling of the character (e.g., How does Silvia feel in
this situation?). Stimuli include seven di erent emotions: sadness
(N = 10), fear (N = 10), shame (N = 12), disgust (N = 3),
happiness (N = 10), anger (N = 10), and envy (N = 3). In the
theory-of-mind task, stories (N = 13) involved two or more
characters interacting (e.g., Katia and Emma are two children
and are playing at home. Emma gets a banana and puts it close
to her ear and says to Katia: Look, it’s a phone). The participant
must answer specific questions related to the character’s point
of view (e.g., Is what Emma said true?). The social situation
task includes stories in which two distinct social behaviors are
highlighted (written in bold): one involves a normal social
behavior and the other a social norm violation. The participant
is asked to rate whether the behavior of the character can be
considered normal, using the letters from “a” to “d” to indicate,
respectively, a normal behavior to an extremely strange behavior.
This test provides three scores: normal behavior identified, social
violations identified, and the severity of the social violations.
In the moral/conventional distinction test, stories related to
children behaviors at school are presented. In half of the stories
(N = 6), one character is a victim of harm or of an injustice
by other characters (moral condition), while in the other half of
the stories, one character is involved in a social rule violation,
without provoking any injury to other individuals. Participants
are asked to answer four questions: (1) whether the character
is behaving in a proper way, (2) how serious is the behavior
from a scale of 0 to 10, and (3) whether this behavior can be
considered right in another country with di erent rules or (4)
in case the teacher allows any children to behave as they want.
Hence, for each condition of the moral/conventional distinction
task, three di erent scores are provided: accuracy in detecting
forbidden behavior (1), the severity of the violation (2), and
the accuracy in detecting forbidden behavior without given
rules (3 and 4).
Shame and Guilt Task (SGT)
To measure participants’ subjective experience of shame and
guilt, we developed the SGT. The SGT is a behavioral task
that recreates several scenarios of social interaction between the
participant and di erent partners. During this interaction, the
participant is exposed to di erent social judgments concerning
his person or behavior through verbal scripts. Such an interaction
is recreated by proposing the partner’s photo in addition to the
evaluation expressed in text form. To maximize the interpersonal
aspect during such interactions, we have employed the face as
a salient social stimulus, in addition to the assessment (our
target stimulus).
Participants were asked to imagine that the person in the
picture (the “judge”) expresses the judgment directed toward
them, as in a real social interaction. In the test, stimuli included 18
pictures associated with 18 judgments. Judgments included two
conditions: the “social standards” condition involved violations
of social norms or social standards (e.g., “You have put on
a lot of weight”) and the “harming others” condition involves
injuries or harm toward an individual, made by the participant
(e.g., “You destroyed my life”). While the social “standards
condition” should elicit higher shame ratings, the “harming
others” condition should elicit higher ratings of both shame and
guilt, as proposed in previous studies (Lewis et al., 1993; Tangney
et al., 2007). Pictures were taken from the NimStim database
(Tottenham et al., 2009) and included Caucasian individuals
of both genders (50% females). Participants were asked to
imagine that the person in the picture (the “judge”) expresses
the judgment directed toward them and to rate their subjective
experience of shame and guilt on a Likert scale from 0 to 6.
Emotion Recognition Tasks
Emotional Facial Expressions Recognition Task
In this task, we included 120 grayscale facial pictures taken from
theMontreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (MSFDE, Beaupré
et al., 2000). A subset of this database includes pictures obtained
by morphing neutral and emotional pictures at various degrees
(20, 40, 60, and 80%). We selected for each emotion (anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and shame) morphed pictures
from 20 to 80% and fully emotional pictures. For each condition
(each emotion at any intensity of expression), we included four
items (i.e., four di erent face identities) (e.g., four trials for anger
expressed with the intensity of 20%). Participants were asked to
label the emotion presented into di erent labels (anger, disgust,
fear, happiness, sadness, shame, and neutral).
Emotional Prosody Recognition Task
Participants were auditorily exposed to 48 sentences with neutral
content (e.g., “the book is on the table”) and emotional prosody,
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through the use of headphones. The emotions were anger, fear,
disgust, happiness, sadness, and surprise. Stimuli included four
items for each emotion and were presented in random order.
Participants were asked first to identify the emotion conveyed
by the prosody by choosing among di erent options (anger, fear,
disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise, and neutral) and then to rate
the intensity of the emotion on a Likert scale from 0 to 7.
Emotional Gestures Recognition Task
The set of 32 grayscale body photographs expressing emotional
body gestures used in the current task is derived from BEAST1
(De Gelder and Van den Stock, 2011; see also Cecchetto et al.,
2014). The actors’ faces were covered by a gray circle, so that
her/his facial emotion was not visible. Emotions included anger,
fear, happiness, and sadness. Participants were asked to identify
the emotion expressed by body gestures by selecting between five
options – anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and neutral – and to
rate on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7 the intensity of the
emotion expressed.
Statistical Analyses
The patient’s scores on the neuropsychological and social
cognition batteries were compared with the available normative
data, while those on the other tests, including PANAS, emotion
recognition tasks, and SGT, were compared with the controls’
scores. Specifically, we used the software “SingleBayes_ES.exe1,”
implementing themethod described by Crawford andGarthwaite
(2007) and Crawford et al. (2010), which is widely used in
case report studies and allows controlling for type I errors
when comparing the patient’s and controls’ performance scores.
This method estimates, within a Bayesian framework, the point
of abnormality of the patient’s score (PA) and the associated
95% credible limits (CL). In addition, the PA provides the
percentage of the healthy population obtaining a score lower
than the patient’s. Then, in case of deficit, a second analysis was
performed (e.g., Bayesian standardized di erence test) (Crawford
and Garthwaite, 2007; Crawford et al., 2010), using the software
DissocsBayes_ES.exe2, to test whether the patient’s performance
reduction is significantly lower than other scores of the same
task, configuring a strong or classical dissociation (Crawford and
Garthwaite, 2005). Since we expected that FF was impaired in
these tasks, one-tailed tests were used. This method of analysis
was applied to PANAS, emotion recognition from a prosody task,
the emotional gestures recognition task, and SGT.
The facial emotion recognition task was first analyzed with
one-sample t-tests (one-tailed) vs. chance level with the software
Jamovi3 to test whether participants performed above chance
level at any intensity of emotional expressions. Secondly, the
patient’s and controls’ performances were compared. Since
participants were asked to choose between six options in the
task (anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and shame) in four trials
for each emotional intensity, the chance level was set to 0.07.




chance level if their total accuracies for each emotional intensity
were equal to 0 or 1, while they were considered above chance
if the score was 2, 3, or 4. Then, given the complexity of
the design, the patient’s and controls’ performances on facial
emotion recognition task were compared with mixed-e ect
models (MMs), using the program R4 and the package lme45.
MMs represent a powerful tool in the analysis of single-case data,
allowing us to compare the patient’s and controls’ performances
even in complex study designs, such as repeated-measure designs
(Huber et al., 2015; Wiley and Rapp, 2018). Specifically, we used a
generalized mixed-e ect model (function glmer) on the accuracy
of the facial emotion recognition task (binomial) using the subject
and the identity of the actor in the stimuli as random factors
and the group (patient and controls), the emotion type (anger,
disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and shame), the emotion intensity, and
their interactions as fixed factors. Then, we removed stepwise
any fixed factors not inducing any significant loss of fit to the
model (tested with the likelihood ratio test). The final model
included as fixed factors the interaction between group and
emotion and the interaction between emotion and intensity.
To explore the interactions, we performed a planned contrast
between the patient’s and controls’ scores for each emotion type
(lsmeans6). Then, similar to the analyses of the other tasks,
in case of deficit, we tested whether the patient’s performance
reduction on one emotion was significantly di erent from those
of other emotions. Specifically, we contrasted the di erence in the
patient’s and controls’ performances on each impaired emotion





FF’s results are summarized in Table 1. He was impaired at
the Wisconsin’s card sorting test and similarities subtest of the
WAIS. battery, suggesting a deficit a ecting abstraction abilities.
His performances on phonological and semantic fluencies were
also poor, while on alternate semantic/phonological fluency,
it was at the average level. The patient’s score on Benton’s
facial recognition test was in the borderline range. The a ective
state of FF, measured by the positive and negative scores of
PANAS, was not di erent from that of healthy controls [positive
a ect score: FF = 37, controls = 29.92 ± 7.43, Z = 0.95,
PA = 81.17 (60.92–94.51), p > 0.1; negative a ect score: FF = 18;
controls = 18.33 ± 7.28, Z =  0.05, PA = 48.30 (27.84–69.16),
ps > 0.1].
Social Cognition Battery
The emotion attribution task (see Table 2) revealed that FF was
impaired in attributing sadness and disgust to characters of brief
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TABLE 2 | Patient’s scores on the social cognition battery.
Test Score Range Cutoffs
Theory of mind 12 0–13   12
Emotion attribution
-Sadness 5* 0–10   6
-Fear 10 0–10   8
-Shame 10 0–12   8
-Disgust 1* 0–3   2
-Joy 9 0–10   10
-Anger 9 0–10   6
-Envy 3 0–3   1
Social situations
-Identification of correct social behaviors 12* 0–15   13
-Identification of social violations 20* 0–25   22
-Rating of the entity of violations 45 0–75   45
Moral/conventional distinction
-Moral behaviors 6 0–6   6
-Conventional behaviors 6 0–6   5
*Impaired performance.
FIGURE 2 | Patient’s (dark gray) and healthy controls’ (light gray) scores on
the SGT. The error bars indicate standard deviations.
and envy was above the cuto . It is worth noting that errors in
sadness and disgust attributions includedmainly anger (errors on
sadness: 80% anger, 20% shame; errors on disgust: 100% anger).
On the social situation task, FF showed impaired abilities in
identifying normal social behavior and social violations, while
his evaluation of the severity of the social violation was just
above the cuto . The patient’s performances on both the theory-
of-mind task and the moral/conventional distinction task were
in normal ranges.
SGT
FF’s shame ratings (see Figure 2) on the “social standards”
condition were marginally lower than those of healthy controls
(FF = 0.78, healthy controls = 2.96 ± 1.20, Zcc =  1.82,
PA = 5.28, superior CL = 15.00, p = 0.053), and his ratings
on the “harming others” condition were within the control
level (FF = 3.78, healthy controls = 4.38 ± 0.71, Zcc =  0.85,
PA = 21.58, superior CL = 38.44, p > 0.1). Moreover,
patient’s ratings of guilt were not di erent from those of
controls in any condition (social standards: FF = 1.78, healthy
controls = 2.47 ± 1.00, Zcc =  0.69, PA = 25.95, superior
CL = 43.41, p > 0.1; harming others: FF = 4.56, healthy
controls = 4.76 ± 0.63, Zcc =  0.32, PA = 38.25, superior
CL = 56.27, p > 0.1. The reduction in shame ratings for
the “social standard” condition was also significantly di erent
than guilt ratings on the same condition (Z-dcc =  1.90,
PA = 4.65, superior CL = 20.41, p < 0.05), while it was not
significantly di erent than shame ratings on the “harming others”
condition (Z-dcc =  1.03, PA = 17.12, superior CL = 44.55,
p > 0.1).
Facial Emotion Recognition Task
Healthy individuals recognized all the emotions above chance
level when the intensities ranged between 40 and 100% (all
ps < 0.05). When the intensity was 20%, controls’ performances
on anger were also above chance level (p < 0.01), but this was
not the case for all the other emotions (all ps > 0.05) (see
Figure 3 and Table 3). Patient FF showed a similar pattern to
that of healthy controls when emotions were expressed at the
20% intensity, except for sadness, which was recognized above
chance level, and for disgust at 60%, which was recognized
at chance level. In addition, FF recognized shameful facial
expressions at chance level at any intensity of presentation, while
he performed at chance level when fear was expressed at 40, 60,
and 80% intensities.
The mixed-e ect generalized linear model (logLik =  854.2,
marginal r2 = 0.39, conditional r2 = 0.44) revealed a significant
main e ect of emotion [$2(5) = 48.18, p < 0.001] and intensity
[$2(1) = 232.85, p < 0.001] and significant interactions of
group ⇤ emotion [$2(5) = 27.34, p < 0.001] and emotion ⇤
intensity [$2(5) = 49.21, p < 0.001]. Participants were overall
more accurate in recognizing faces displaying joy than all
other emotions (joy vs. sadness: z = 2.71, p = 0.07, all other
ps < 0.05), except for those displaying anger (p > 0.1). Shame
and fear were recognized less accurately than all the other
emotions (all ps < 0.05). However, no significant di erence
was evident from the comparisons between FF’s and controls’
performances for any emotion displayed (all ps > 0.05). Indeed,
even though FF recognized shame and fear at chance level, while
controls performed above chance, the di erence among their
performances did not reach significance level (fear: z =  2.43,
p = 0.088; shame: z = 2.55, p = 0.063).
Emotional Gestures Recognition Task
FF’s performance on emotional gesture recognition task (see
Table 4) did not di er from that of healthy controls in any of the
emotions investigated (all ps> 0.01), highlighting that the patient
was not impaired in recognizing emotions from body gestures.
Emotion Recognition From Prosody
The analyses of emotion recognition of auditory stimuli did
not show any significant di erence in patient’s and controls’
performances (all ps > 0.1) (see Table 4).
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FIGURE 3 | Patient’s (dark gray triangle) performance and healthy controls’ (light gray dot) mean performance on emotional facial recognition task. Bars indicate
standard deviations.
TABLE 3 | FF’s and controls’ performance in the Facial Emotion Recognition Task for all intensity levels.
Emotion Intensity
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
HC FF Zcc HC FF Zcc HC FF Zcc HC FF Zcc HC FF Zcc
Anger 1.23 ± 0.73 0  1.7 2.46 ± 1.27 2  0.36 3.46 ± 0.78 3  0.59 3.77 ± 0.44 3  1.75 3.31 ± 0.75 4 0.92
Disgust 0.31 ± 0.63 1 1.1 1.85 ± 1.34 3 0.86 2.92 ± 1.32 1  1.46 3.00 ± 1.29 4 0.77 3.23 ± 1.24 3  0.19
Fear 0.31 ± 0.48 0  0.64 1.08 ± 0.76 0  1.42 2.08 ± 1.32 1  0.82 3.00 ± 1.15 0  2.6 3.08 ± 0.95 2  1.13
Joy 1.08 ± 0.86 0  1.25 2.85 ± 1.28 4 0.9 3.31 ± 0.85 3  0.36 3.85 ± 0.38 4 0.41 4.00 ± 0.00 4 /
Sadness 1.08 ± 0.95 3 2.02 1.85 ± 1.41 3 0.82 1.77 ± 1.17 4 1.91 2.31 ± 1.03 3 0.67 2.15 ± 1.21 3 0.70
Shame 0.15 ± 0.38 0  0.41 1.46 ± 1.33 1  0.35 2.23 ± 1.42 0  1.57 2.77 ± 1.09 0  2.54 2.77 ± 1.17 1  1.52
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TABLE 4 | FF’s and controls’ accuracy scores in the different emotion
recognition tasks.
FF Controls Zcc PA (Upper CL)
Mean SD
Body emotion recognition accuracy
Anger 6 6.90 1.60  0.56 30.25 (54.87)
Fear 8 7.40 0.70 0.86 78.26 (92.68)
Joy 3 5.10 2.13  0.99 18.60 (37.39)
Sadness 8 8.00 0.00 – –
Prosody emotion recognition accuracy
Anger 4 3.50 0.71 0.70 74.06 (89.85)
Disgust 3 1.90 1.20 0.92 79.76 (93.62)
Fear 4 3.40 0.97 0.62 71.51 (88.00)
Joy 3 3.10 0.99  0.10 46.28 (66.41)
Sadness 3 3.50 0.53  0.94 19.60 (30.64)
Surprise 3 3.00 0.94 0.00 50.01 (69.86)
Zcc, effect size; PA, point of abnormality of the patient’s score, expressing the
percentage of the healthy population falling below FF’s score.
DISCUSSION
In the present single-case study, we tested the role of the
amygdala in the perceptual and experiential processing of shame.
Patient FF, with acquired bilateral amygdala and hippocampal
damage, performed several tests tapping subjective emotional
experience of shame, emotion recognition, and social cognition.
The assessment of the subjective experience of shame revealed
two di erent patterns of findings. FF experienced less shame than
controls when exposed to social standard violations but not to
moral violations. FF’s and controls’ guilt ratings did not di er in
any condition. This pattern of results is not congruent with the
view of a primary role for the amygdala in shame generation.
Indeed, if the amygdala was involved in the generation of a
subjective experience of shame, after its lesion, we would expect a
reduction of both shame ratings across all situations and not only
in association with social standard violations.
However, the selective reduction in FF’s shame experience in
reaction to social standard violation might be easily explained
considering his deficit in recognizing whether a social situation
was normal or not in the social cognition battery. Indeed,
FF’s reduction in the subjective experience of shame might be
secondary to the impaired ability to detect whether a social
situation is to be considered normal: if an individual is not
able to detect the occurrence of a social violation, she will not
be able to react properly to such violation. This latter finding
might be interpreted at least in two ways. First, the patient
lacks social knowledge and, hence, is not able to compare
the perceived social stimuli to prior knowledge, and second,
he is not able to detect the relevant cues that are necessary
for understanding the social situation and that need to be
matched with prior social knowledge. While several studies
reveal that the crucial region involved in representing social
knowledge is the anterior temporal lobe (Olson et al., 2013;
Wang et al., 2017) and that a lesion of this area, even sparing
the amygdala, leads to pervasive impairments in emotional
and social behaviors (i.e., psychic blindness) due to degraded
social knowledge (Franzen and Myers, 1973), the amygdala was
proposed to be involved in disambiguation, orienting attention to
salient cues in order to understand stimulus meaning (Whalen,
1999; Adolphs, 2010). Indeed, neuroimaging studies revealed
that amygdala activation was modulated by the ambiguity of the
stimulus (Davis et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2017). FF’s ability to
discriminate between moral and conventional social situations
was spared, possibly because the situations presented were
less ambiguous, and this is consistent with our interpretation
that FF su ers from deficit in disambiguating the stimuli.
Even though it is not possible to exclude that the patient’s
impairment in detecting social violations might be due to the
involvement of structures in close proximity to the amygdala,
we argue that the role of the amygdala in orienting attention
to salient cues to deal with ambiguous social situations might
explain this deficit.
In addition, FF also showed impaired performances on some
tasks tapping executive functions such as the similarity task,
Wisconsin card sorting test, and verbal fluency tasks. However,
FF’s deficit was not extended to all the tests tapping executive
functions, but only to those requiring abstraction abilities. Recent
evidence (Saez et al., 2015) suggested not only that frontal lobes
are crucial for executive functions (Alvarez and Emory, 2006) but
also that the amygdala might contribute to high-order cognitive
functions, specifically being involved in representing abstract
cognitive information. This interpretation of FF’s performance
on neuropsychological battery might also better explain the
patient’s deficit in understanding social situations, which are
abstract in nature.
Results on the emotion recognition task revealed that,
even though there was no significant di erence between the
performances of FF and controls, the patient recognized shameful
and fearful facial expressions at chance level, while controls
performed above chance. This might be attributable to the low
number of trials per condition and, consequently, to the low
sensitivity of this task to detect mild deficits. However, the
inability to recognize fearful and shameful facial expressions
of FF, although not di erent from that of controls, might
reflect nevertheless a deficit in recognizing the two emotions.
While the deficit at recognizing fearful facial expressions is
consistent with previous evidence (Adolphs et al., 1994; Calder,
1996), shameful facial expression recognition has not been
systematically investigated before. Social emotion recognition
impairment (including moral emotions) from faces was only
reported in patients with acquired amygdala damage (Adolphs
et al., 2002), without any distinction about the specific facial
emotion impaired. The same emotions were not impaired in
the emotion attribution task of the social cognition battery,
indicating that FF was able to recognize shame and fear
from written stories, but he was impaired when faces were
used as stimuli. In addition, FF’s ability to recognize specific
emotions from bodily gestures and from prosody was completely
preserved. FF’s poor performance on fear recognition, which
was limited to facial expression, not involving bodily gestures
and prosody, confirms previous research on patients with
amygdala damage (Adolphs and Tranel, 1999; Atkinson et al.,
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2007; Bach et al., 2013). This pattern of results can be
explained with the amygdala being involved in orienting
attention to the eye region when presented with a facial
stimulus (Jacobs et al., 2012). Indeed, the eye region is
diagnostic in the identification of fear (Smith et al., 2005)
and is poorly fixated by patients with amygdala damage
during face presentation (Adolphs et al., 2005; Spezio et al.,
2007).
Although whether the eye region might be diagnostic of
shameful expression recognition has never been tested, the action
tendencies associated with the shame experience seem to involve
gaze movement downward, blushing, and inhibition of speech
and movement (Asendorpf, 1990; Keltner and Buswell, 1997).
Hence, the deficit of allocating attention toward the eye region
might prevent patients with amygdala damage from perceiving
a shift of gaze direction downward, typically associated with
shameful facial expression.
Di erent from facial expression recognition, FF performed
poorly in sadness and disgust attribution from brief stories on
the social cognition battery. Previous studies highlighted the
association between disgust and sadness, and amygdala and
hippocampus processing. Indeed, a recent study reported that
increased variability of a subnetwork formed by the amygdala
and the hippocampus correlated with worsening mood and
depression (Kirkby et al., 2018). For disgust, a recent study by
Pujol et al. (2018) found the involvement of the hippocampus
in response to disgusting food, and another experiment (Blanco-
Hinojo et al., 2019) showed abnormal responses to disgusting
food inside the hippocampus of individuals a ected by Prader–
Willi syndrome when compared to controls. We might speculate
that the patientmight have performed poorly in detecting sad and
disgusting scenes in the attribution task because a damage of the
hippocampus (for disgust) and of the amygdala–hippocampus
circuit (for sadness) could have led also to mild deficits in
processing sad and disgusting scenes. However, further research
is necessary to confirm our findings.
CONCLUSION
The investigation of shame and guilt processing in a patient with
acquired damage within bilateral amygdalae and surrounding
tissues revealed reduced feelings of shame in self-relevant
social situations in association with a deficit in discriminating
normal social situations and social violations and impaired
performance on the Wisconsin card sorting test and WAIS
analogies. In addition, the patient performed poorly in
shameful (and fearful) facial expression recognition. This
pattern of findings is congruent with a deficit in detecting
salient cues in order to understand social situations and,
consequently, to generate shame feelings in case of violations.
Hence, the amygdala integrity appears to be relevant in
the detection of social stimuli but not in the generation
of moral emotions such as shame and guilt. These findings
are more easily explained assuming a role of the amygdala
in ambiguity and uncertainty resolution, as suggested by
Whalen (1999). However, further research is necessary in
order to better understand the role of the amygdala in moral
emotion processing.
Limitations
The present study involves the testing of a patient with a bilateral
lesion of the amygdala that extends to the surrounding part
of the hippocampus. Hence, the reported deficits might also
be attributable to the lesion of both the hippocampus and
the amygdala. Moreover, MRI acquisition and cognitive testing
occurred at di erent time points (i.e., 4 months’ interval). Hence,
the patient’s behavioral findings might not correspond strictly to
the detected damaged brain areas.
The lack of data about premorbid patient’s cognitive
performances does not allow us to make causal inferences
about the role of the damaged areas in influencing behavior.
However, the associations between specific brain lesions and
impaired behavioral performances give interesting hints on
the role of amygdala. In addition, the findings of single-case
studies have low generalizability and need to be confirmed by
further group studies. However, the relative rarity of the case
described gives an important contribution in the understanding
of amygdala functioning.
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